Russia's Shadow Fleet

Crude Accountability Report

In a two-year investigation, Crude Accountability has tracked and identified eight ships that facilitate the Russian oil trade from the ports of Taman, Ust Luga, Murmansk, and Novorossiysk despite the sanctions placed on the Russian Federation since its war of aggression against Ukraine began. These oil products enter EU ports while Western companies continue to insure, support, own, and operate the vessels that carry the product to market. In many cases, Crude Accountability was able to identify and track ships conducting ship-to-ship transfers within EU waters, creating serious risks of oil spillage and environmental damage to the Gulf of Lakonia, Greece

On January 10, 2025, the US government sanctioned 183 ships associated with the Russian shadow fleet. Two of these, the Nanda Devi and the Sagitta, were identified by Crude Accountability as likely being associated with the Russian shadow fleet but were not tracked. The actions of the US government are commendable but they are far from enough. This report contains details on an additional eight ships and an index of 15 more, which we strongly believe are part of the Russian shadow fleet. The risk these aging tankers pose was evident on December 15th, 2024, when two aging Russian oil tankers, Volgoneft-212 and Volgoneft-239, were wrecked in a storm in the Strait of Kerch, dumping 5,000 tons of fuel oil into the surrounding waters, contaminating both the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. The risk of additional catastrophes looms large as long as the Russian shadow fleet continues to operate. European Union waters, especially in Greece, are at particular risk, but this is an environmental danger that impacts the entire world.

Disclaimer: The following dates of arrival and duration of time in a specific locality may not match due to travel time between flagged destinations.

Marinetraffic.com/Michael Warrick

Marinetraffic.com/Michael Warrick

Marinetraffic.com/Sinisa Aljinovic

Marinetraffic.com/Sinisa Aljinovic

Agios Nikolaos

Marinetraffic.com/Heiner Trappmann

Marinetraffic.com/Heiner Trappmann

Summary of Activity: Crude Accountability tracked the Agios Nikolaos between July 2022 and October 2023. During that time, the crude oil tanker entered Russian oil ports and conducted several ship-to-ship transfers. The Agios Nikolaos entered the Russian ports of Primorsk, Novorossiysk, St. Petersburg, Taman, and Tuapse. The ship also entered the non-Russian ports of Chekka, Zahrani Terminal, Beirut, Tanger Med, Wilhelmshaven, Nordenham, Bremen, Weser-petrol, Riga, Algeciras, Jorf Lasfar, and La Goulette Nord. The Agios Nikolaos engaged in ship-to-ship transfers within the Laconian Gulf, Greece.

Significance of activity: The Agios Nikolaos transported Russian oil to six different countries within a year. Additionally, the ship transferred Russian oil to seven different tankers within Greek territorial waters and to an 8th tanker off the coast of Togo. According to the information available to Crude Accountability, Agios Nikolaos maintained its Western-based insurance via London Steamship Owners Mutual Insurance Association Ltd throughout this above-mentioned timeline. This means the ship may have violated sanctions against the Russian Federation, should it have sold any Russian oil products above the established $60 per barrel limit. Additionally, the ship continued to support the Russian oil industry and thus the Russian war effort. This also demonstrates that as late as May 2023, the EU continued to facilitate Russian oil sales within its boundaries. The owner of the Agios Nikolaos, Dimitris Prokopiou, is a member of the Prokopiou family, under George Prokopiou, who has been identified by Ukraine as an EU-based international sponsor of war.

Ship-to-Ship (STS) Transfers

Harbiye (May 7 + May 20) STS transfer with PM Bradley. PM Bradley drifts around the Black Sea for two months before entering Novorossiysk port, Russia

Bianca (May 9) STS transfer with Nanda Devi

Beast (May 11) to Alexandria, Egypt, then to Novorossiysk, Russia

Helen Chem (May 19) STS transfer with Sauri (May 20), STS transfer with Popi P (May 23), then entering Saudi Arabia

Georgia (May 24) to Alexandria, Egypt

Portofino (June 1 + June 4) STS transfer with Namrata (June 8), then entering Saudi Arabia

Departs Laconian Gulf, Greece (June 5)

Konya (formerly, Besiktas Bosphorus)

Marinetraffic.com/Plague Christian

Marinetraffic.com/Plague Christian

Summary of Activity: Crude Accountability tracked the Konya between July 2022 and February 2024. During that time, the tanker entered four Russian ports: Novorossiysk, Taman, Retinskoye, and Murmansk. The ship made additional port calls at five non-Russian ports: Trieste, Taranto, Livorno, Fujairah, and Lanshan. Crude Accountability tracked an additional three ship-to-ship transfers conducted, including one within the Greek Laconian Gulf.

Significance of activity: The Konya collected Russian oil products from three Russian ports: Novorossiysk, Retinskoye, and Murmansk, and from ship-to-ship transfers near the ports of Taman and Retinskoye. These products were transported to five non-Russian ports: Trieste, Taranto, Livorno, Fujairah, and Lanshan, three of which are located within the EU. An additional STS transfer was conducted within Greek waters of the Laconian Gulf. This means that the ship, along with its Western-based insurance, may have violated sanctions against the Russian Federation, should it have sold any Russian oil products above the established $60 per barrel limit. Additionally, the ship continued to support the Russian oil industry and thus the Russian war effort. This also means that as late as May 2023, the EU continued to facilitate Russian oil sales within its boundaries.

STS transfer with Sea Marine (May 8) – Sea Marine came from Novorossiysk, Russia

STS transfer Vasily Dinkov

Eco Beverly Hills

Marinetraffic.com/Raimo Makinen

Marinetraffic.com/Raimo Makinen

Summary of Activity: Crude Accountability tracked the Eco Beverly Hills between October 2022 and July 2023. During that time, the tanker entered the Russian ports of Ust-Luga and Novorossiysk six times. In between these entries, the tanker made voyages to eight non-Russian ports, Milazzo (Italy), Tutunciftlik (Türkiye), Aliaga (Türkiye), Ceyhan (Türkiye), Trieste (Italy), Santa Panagia (Italy), Syracuse (Italy), and Marseille (France). Five of these ports are within the EU. On May 16th, 2023, the Eco Beverly Hills disappeared off tracking for two days near the coast of Israel. It is unclear if the ship’s AIS tracker was intentionally turned off and what the ship's intended destination was. The Eco Beverly Hills returned to the port of Novorossiysk on May 28th, 2023.

Significance of activity: The Eco Beverly Hills acquired Russian oil products from the ports of Ust Luga and Novorossiysk six times throughout the timeline. The tanker then transported those products to eight non-Russian ports, entering Tutunciftlik and Aliaga (Türkiye) at least twice. Through the transport of these Russian oil products, Eco Beverly Hills maintained British-based insurance; originally Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Ltd until February 2023, followed by its current insurance under U.K. Mutual Steam Ship Assurance Association (Bermuda) Ltd. The combination of transporting Russian oil products, especially from the sanctioned port of Ust Luga, to ports within Türkiye and the EU, while maintaining Western-based insurance, classification certification, and ownership suggests possible sanctions violations should those products have been sold over the established $60 per barrel limit. This information also demonstrates that actors in the West, the EU included, continue to facilitate and profit off of the Russian oil trade.

Hamsi

Marinetraffic.com/Knut Helge Schistad

Marinetraffic.com/Knut Helge Schistad

Summary of Activity: Crude Accountability Tracked the Hamsi between April and November of 2023. The Hamsi rarely made port calls but conducted an unprecedented number of ship-to-ship transfers during tracking. The Hamsi conducted twenty-six ship-to-ship transfers during the tracking period and pulled into Greek ports six times. These ports are the Corinth Oil Refinery and the Piraeus Container Terminal. In each of the instances of ship-to-ship transfers, the Hamsi labeled each maneuver as “bunkering” which is typically equivalent to “refueling” for most motorized vehicles. In these instances, the ship would be “bunkered” by Russian ships in between the ports of Taman and Novorossiysk, followed by bunkering by Turkish ships off the southern coast of Türkiye. The Hamsi would only “bunker” prior to a voyage to either of the above-mentioned Greek ports and would only re-bunker after returning to the portion of the Black Sea between the ports of Taman and Novorossiysk.

Significance of activity: The Hamsi regularly received Russian oil products, indicated as “bunkering” before entering Greek ports. The Hamsi would receive multiple ships for its “bunkering,” as many as six bunkerings would take place on its repeated voyage to the Corinth Oil Refinery and Piraeus Container Terminal. Throughout the timeline of its activity, the Hamsi maintained its Norwegian-based insurance, Assuranceforeningen Skuld. In normal circumstances, and as demonstrated in previous entries to the dossier, ship-to-ship transfers are labeled “ship-to-ship transfers” or STS transfers. Bunkering is a separate category of transfer that is typically used to refuel a ship. However, the Hamsi never made port calls to Novorossiysk or any other port to receive oil products. The Hamsi only ever conducted “bunkerings” with multiple ships while on its way to the abovementioned Greek ports. This is highly suspicious activity and may suggest the Hamsi intended to hide the origins of its cargo. The number of bunkerings it received while on its voyages, as many as six on one voyage, is also highly suspicious and further supports the claim that these were not “bunkerings” intended to refuel the ship but rather ship-to-ship transfers intentionally labeled otherwise. Should those products that it received have been sold over the $60 per barrel limit and should the Hamsi failed to indicate the origins of the cargo, the tanker may very well have intentionally violated sanctions against the Russian Federation.

Bunkering

Armada Navigator (April 23)

Nikolay Gamayunov (April 24)

Nikolai Velikiy (April 26)

Bunkering

Su Deryasi 4 (May 4)

Alsancak 2 (May 4)

Recommendations

For OSCE participating states: Greater regulatory efforts must be put into place concerning insurance companies, shipping companies, and classification societies within participating state national territories. These efforts should work to hold the aforementioned accountable for any possible sanction violations that might occur within or without the national territory of the participating states.

A publicly accessible monitoring system should be in place to track the sale of Russian oil within participating state territories. In particular, the sale price, origin, and all ships involved in its transport to Western ports should be documented and made available to the public.

For Civil Society: Greater efforts must be employed to watch for ship-to-ship transfers occurring within respective national territories. Civil society should serve as watchdogs in this manner, developing a coherent list of ships, ports, and territorial waters involved in the continued Russian oil trade via ship-to-ship transfers.

Within the territories identified for ship-to-ship transfers, civil society should maintain vigilance for signs of oil spillage, regardless of how small. If Russian oil is being spilled in national or international waters, affecting the sea and the livelihoods of those people around the sea, the public deserves to understand where this damage may come from and from whom.

Marinetraffic.com/Oguz Eroguz

Marinetraffic.com/Oguz Eroguz